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PREVIEW: “The Dog Told Him to Do It”: Kahler v. Kansas, And the
Constitutionality of the Insanity Defense
Kevin Ness
Oral argument in Kahler v. Kansas took place October 7, 2019 at 10
A.M. before the United States Supreme Court in Washington, D.C. 1
Sarah O’Rouke Schrup argued for the Petitioner, James Kraig Kahler. 2
Kansas Solicitor General Toby Cruise argued for the Respondent, the
State of Kansas. 3 Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States
Elizabeth B. Prelogar, as amicus curiae, argued in support of the
Respondent. 4
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case directly addresses the issue of whether, under the
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
Kansas can restrict a defendant’s use of the insanity defense to only
allow evidence that he could not form the requisite mens rea, or criminal
intent, element of the charged crime. This case has significant
implications because a ruling in favor of Petitioner would likely
invalidate the current mental disease or defect defense 5 in Kansas,
Montana, Idaho, and Utah.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death for killing four members of his family in 2009. 6 At trial, Petitioner
did not contest that he had killed his estranged wife, her mother, and his
two daughters. 7 Rather, Petitioner maintained that he was suffering from
such “overwhelming obsessive compulsions and extreme emotional
disturbances” that he was dissociating from reality at the time of the
killings. 8 Petitioner claimed that he became detached from reality
following the deterioration of his marriage. 9
1

Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019) (No. 18-6135).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
For purposes of clarity, “mental disease or defect” will be used interchangeably with
“insanity defense” when referring to Kansas’, Montana’s, Idaho’s, and Utah’s current approach to
the introduction of evidence regarding mental disability by a defendant for the purposes of defending
a criminal charge.
6
Brief for Petitioner at 11, Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. May 31, 2019) (No. 18-6135); Brief
for the Respondent at 12, Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. Aug. 2, 2019) (No. 18-6135).
7
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 11; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 9.
8
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 6.
9
Id. at 7; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 2–3.
2
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Prior to trial, both parties employed forensic psychiatrists to
evaluate Petitioner. 10 The forensic psychiatrists for both parties reached
the same conclusion: Petitioner was suffering from “obsessive
compulsive personality disorder, major depressive disorder, and
borderline, paranoid and narcissistic personality tendencies.” 11 But,
Kansas has limited a defendant’s use of evidence of mental illness as a
defense to a crime to only whether the defendant could form the requisite
mens rea. 12 By doing so Kansas has removed the issue of whether a
defendant, because of mental illness, may be morally culpable for their
actions, from the jury. 13 Thus, Respondent offered evidence to show
Petitioner possessed the requisite mental state to find him guilty of the
murders. 14 The jury agreed, and Petitioner was sentenced to death. 15
Subsequently, Petitioner lost his direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme
Court, albeit under two dissenting opinions. 16
II.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
A.

Petitioner’s Argument

Petitioner argues that Kansas’ mens rea approach to the insanity
defense violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. 17 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment serves to protect “those ‘principle[s] of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.’” 18 Citing long-standing historical practice, the Petitioner
asserts that a basic tenet of the insanity defense has been to punish only
those who are morally culpable for their actions. 19 Additionally,
Petitioner argues the common usage of the insanity defense in American
legal systems by pointing to the fact that forty-six states, the federal
judiciary, and the military courts currently allow the affirmative defense
of insanity. 20 In fact, up until 1979, every state had the affirmative
defense of insanity until Montana became the first state to legislatively
adopt a new approach. 21 History and practice also dictates that punishing
those who are not morally culpable would have been cruel and unusual at
10

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 5.
13
Id. at 41.
14
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 11–12.
15
Id. at 11.
16
State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 133–134 (Kan. 2018).
17
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 15–16.
18
Id. at 16 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
19
Id. at 17–29.
20
Id. at 26–27.
21
Id.
11
12
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the time of the founding, and thus fundamentally violates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 22 Finally,
Petitioner maintains that Kansas’s mental disease or defect defense
framework does not adequately protect severely mentally ill defendants
because it stigmatizes them with a criminal conviction and potentially
exposes them to incarceration where medical treatment may be
inadequate. 23
B.

Respondent’s Argument

The substantive portions of Kansas’s argument are threefold: (1) no
specific insanity defense is so deeply rooted in our nation’s history and
traditions as to trigger the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
protections; 24 (2) with regard to criminal law, the States are free to adopt
their own approach to the insanity defense; 25 and (3) the Eighth
Amendment only prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and does not
require that the States provide certain affirmative defenses. 26 In its Due
Process argument Kansas concedes that the insanity defense has existed
for hundreds of years. 27 But, the insanity defense has taken on multiple
forms throughout its existence and jurisdictions are allowed play within
the joints to determine how they want the defense used in practice. 28
Criminal law has largely been left for the states to decide, therefore, no
federal constitutional standard should be invoked as long as some form
the defense is available. 29 As for the cruel and unusual punishment
argument, no case law supports Petitioner’s position that the Eighth
Amendment requires certain defenses be available to a defendant. 30
III.
A.

Analysis and Application to Montana

Mental Disease or Defect Defense Structure in Kansas and
Montana

Except for minor semantic differences, Montana’s mental disease or
defect defense structure is identical to that of Kansas. Montana, like
Kansas, has a three-stage integration of the defense: pretrial, 31 trial, 32 and

22

Id. at 30–31.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 32–36.
24
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 18.
25
Id. at 19–40.
26
Id. at 16.
27
Id. at 19–21.
28
Id. at 18–19, 37.
29
Id. at 38.
30
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 48–49.
31
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3222 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1)(a)(i) (2019).
32
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1)(a)(ii) (2019).
23
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sentencing. 33 Before trial, the defendant must notify opposing counsel
that the issue of mental capacity to form the requisite intent will be
raised. 34 During trial, the defendant may only admit evidence of mental
disease or defect inasmuch as it directly attacks the mens rea element of
the crime. 35 Finally, at sentencing the traditional test for insanity plays
out and the judge will accept any relevant evidence that might show that
the defendant was unable to appreciate the criminality of his behavior or
conform his behavior to the requirements of law. 36 The purpose of this
determination at sentencing has a large impact on the defendant because
a finding that the defendant neither had the cognitive capacity nor
volitional control determines whether the defendant is sent to a state
prison or state mental hospital. 37
B.

Potential Issues and Impact

The impact of a ruling in favor of the Petitioner will have
significant consequences because it could potentially invalidate the
mental disease or defect scheme in place in Montana since 1979.
Depending on how broad a ruling, it could either impose a constitutional
floor for the insanity defense or leave Montana’s current approach in
limbo until the State’s 2021 legislative session.
Regardless, a favorable ruling for the Petitioner will have to
reconcile with the Court’s prior precedent. Since Leland v. Oregon, 38 the
Court has been reluctant to impose any sort of constitutional standard on
the states regarding how they should administer the insanity defense. 39
This becomes problematic for the Petitioner because in order to show
that what Kansas, Montana, and other states have done to the traditional
insanity defense is a violation of the Constitution requires a showing that
the affirmative defense of insanity is “so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 40 In Clark v.
Arizona, 41 the Court notes that because such a wide and varied array of
33

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a)(6) (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1)(a)(iii)

(2019).
34
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-103 (2019); Andrew King-Ries, Arbitrary and Godlike
Determinations: Insanity, Neuroscience, and Social Control in Montana, 76 MONT. L. REV. 281,
293 (2015).
35
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1)(a)(ii) (2019); King-Ries, supra note 34, 293–94.
36
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (2019); King-Ries, supra note 34, 294.
37
Stephanie C. Simpson, Note, State v. Cowan: The Consequences of Montana’s
Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 55 MONT. L. REV. 503, 522–23 (1994); King-Ries, supra note 34,
294–95.
38
343 U.S. 790 (1952).
39
See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–53 (2006); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
536–37 (1968)
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800–01 (1952).
40
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)
41
Clark, 548 U.S. at 752–53 (“With this varied background, it is clear that no particular
formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the
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insanity defenses exist in the states it is impossible to say in any
constitutional sense that the absence of any specific defense is a violation
of due process. Conversely, one commonality does exist: forty-six states,
the District of Columbia, the federal system, and military jurisdictions
have an affirmative defense of insanity, unlike the four states at issue
here. 42
Recently, the Supreme Court has signaled that the constraints put on
defendants in Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and Utah may be
unconstitutional. Specifically, critics of the mens rea approach and some
members of the Court are concerned about a specific type of mentally ill
defendant: the defendant who acknowledges what they are doing is
wrong, but who cannot control their actions.43 Dissenting from denial of
a writ of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho, 44 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, posed a question which he reiterated
during oral argument in this case. 45 The question states that there are two
defendants, both indisputably insane. 46 Defendant one kills a man,
believing that man to be a dog. 47 Defendant two kills a man, because he
believes a dog was telling him to do it. 48 Thus, extending this logic to the
issue here, why in forty-nine other jurisdictions should a defendant be
allowed to argue that he was insane in both instances and not held
criminally responsible, but in Montana, Kansas, Idaho, and Utah the
defendant could only raise insanity in the first situation?
This line of questioning may indicate that if the Court holds that
Kansas’s statutory framework for the mental disease and defect defense
is unconstitutional, not only must a cognitive “right or wrong” test must
be available, but also a volitional test. This hybrid test has been
advocated by scholars because it serves to better protect a wider array of
mentally ill persons from the stigma of criminal convictions and
incarceration. 49
conceptualization of criminal offenses is substantially open to state choice . . . . There being such
fodder for reasonable debate about what the cognate legal and medical tests should be, due process
imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity”).
42
Clark, 548 U.S. at 751–52.
43
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 935 (Idaho 1990) (McDevvit, J., dissenting); State v.
Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 894 (Mont. 1993) (Treiweiler, J., joined by Hunt, J., dissenting); Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 6, at 41; Brief of American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological
Association, American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, and Mental Health America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 25–31,
Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. Jun. 6, 2019) (No. 18-6135); Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Criminal Law and
Mental Health Law Professors In Support of Petitioner’s Request for Reversal and Remand at 11–
17, Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. Jun. 6, 2019) (No. 18-6135).
44
568 U.S. 1038 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38.
46
Delling, 568 U.S. at 1038.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 242–44 (1972).
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CONCLUSION

The Court should find in favor of Petitioner and hold that limiting a
defendant’s use of the insanity defense to only allow evidence which
shows that they could not form the proper criminal intent is a violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In turn, this
ruling will very likely strike down Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and Utah’s
iteration of the insanity defense.

